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Transferring Away Human Rights: Using
Human Rights to Address Corporate
Transfer Mispricing
Monica Iyer
An estimated sixty percent of international trade happens within multinational enterprises.
Transfer pricing occurs when one part of a firm sets a price in order to sell to another division in
another country. When these prices are deliberately set at something other than market rate in
order to minimize the firm’s tax liability, this is known as transfer mispricing, or abusive transfer
pricing. These practices account for an enormous portion of global illicit financial flows. This
paper will consider transfer mispricing as a violation of human rights, and will look at the ways
in which various human rights instruments and mechanisms might be employed in order to
address this global problem. In doing so, this paper seeks to add to a growing body of literature
that considers the human rights implications and the importance of incorporating a human
rights approach to issues like tax policy, trade, and corruption, with the aim of addressing the
underlying structural drivers of human rights violations. It also seeks to address a gap in law
and policy discussions that is generally characterized by an uneven power relationship between
stakeholders and lack of voice for those most affected.

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years a great deal of global attention has been focused on international taxation
issues, and particularly transfer pricing: the prices that one division or subsidiary of a
transnational corporation (“TNC”)1 sets in order to sell to another division or subsidiary in
another country. It is unsurprising that this should have become an area of focus, given that
estimates hold that up to sixty percent of global trade may now happen within TNCs.2 The
reason that transfer pricing is a significant area of concern is its great potential for transfer
mispricing, also known as abusive transfer pricing, which occurs when firms set prices for these
international intrafirm sales at rates other than the market rate, generally in order to take
advantage of tax differences between jurisdictions. For example, in 2008, revenue authorities in
Zambia investigated a global mining company, Glencore, and found that copper from a mine
primarily owned by a Glencore subsidiary in Zambia was being sold to the Swiss-based parent
1

There has been much discussion of the exact definition of a transnational corporation. This paper will use the terms
“TNC,” “multinational,” “company,” and “firm” interchangeably to discuss “companies or other entities established
in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various ways.” Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 17, (2011),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en.
2
Transfer Pricing, Tax Justice Network, http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/transfer-pricing/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2015).
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company at prices significantly below the market rate.3 These practices, which are sometimes
illegal and sometimes technically legal but still abusive,4 make up a significant proportion of
global illicit financial flows (“IFF”),5 defined as money that is illegally or illicitly obtained,
transferred, or utilized.6 They deprive states of billions of dollars’ worth of potential tax
revenues.7
These abusive corporate practices have been the subject of intense technical discussion by
economists and diplomats, particularly at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”).8 At the same time, a handful of international non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”), notably ActionAid, Christian Aid, and the Tax Justice Network, have
sought to illuminate the human costs of these practices as a result of the revenue lost by
developing countries.9 This paper seeks to build on the work of those organizations, and also on
the work of actors including the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute
(“IBAHRI”) and a number of United Nations Special Rapporteurs who seek to elucidate the
linkages between taxation and human rights, specifically by examining transfer mispricing as a
human rights violation.10
As early as 1992, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Economic and Social Rights recognized
that “the system of levying tax should be a criteria against which compliance with international
obligations is measured, as well as a central means of redressing existing imbalances of income
distribution.”11 Although there is much room for debate regarding the ideal taxation system,12

3

AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL, EQUITY IN EXTRACTIVES: STEWARDING AFRICA’S NATURAL RESOURCES FOR ALL:
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 65 (2013). The Africa Progress Panel is a group of ten high-level individuals from the
public and private sector, chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, that advocates for equitable and
sustainable development in Africa. The Panel issues an annual report that seeks to highlight important issues for
development policy.
4
See infra section II (a) for a discussion of the terms tax evasion, tax avoidance, and tax abuse.
5
DEV KAR & JOSEPH SPANJERS, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: 2003-12 vii (2014) (“The vast majority of illicit financial flows – 77.8 percent in the 10-year period
covered in this report – are due to trade misinvoicing.”).
6
See GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM AFRICA: HIDDEN RESOURCE FOR
DEVELOPMENT 7 (2010).
7
See KAR & SPANJERS, supra note 6, at vii.
8
See, e.g., OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration [CTPA], News Conference – Launch of the 2015 BEPS
Package, (Oct. 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVRVfIz9c64.
9
See, e.g., ACTIONAID, HOW TAX HAVENS PLUNDER THE POOR (May 2013), available at
https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/how_tax_havens_plunder_the_poor_2.pdf. See also
TAX JUSTICE NETWORK-AFRICA & CHRISTIAN AID, AFRICA RISING? INEQUALITIES AND THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF
FAIR TAXATION (Feb. 2014).
10
See LLOYD LIPSETT ET AL., INT’L BAR ASSOC. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., TAX ABUSES, POVERTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT
FINANCIAL FLOWS, POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 28 (Oct. 2013). See also Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (Independent
Expert), U.N. Human Rights Council, Illicit Financial Flows, Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development
Agenda, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/60 (Feb. 10 2015). See also U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepùlveda Carmona, ¶ 77, A/HRC/26/28 (May 22,
2014) [hereinafter Carmona]. See also Philip Alston, Keynote Address at Christian Aid Conference on The Human
Rights Impact of Tax and Fiscal Policy: Tax Policy is Human Rights Policy: The Irish Debate (Feb. 12, 2015)
(transcript available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/EPoverty/Alston-Tax_policy.docx).
11
Danilo Türk (Special Rapporteur, Comm. on Human Rights), The Realization of Economic Social and Cultural
Rights, ¶ 83, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 (July 3, 1992).
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and the optimal tax policy will necessarily vary according to local and national circumstances, 13
it is widely recognized that domestic resource mobilization through progressive taxation can be
an important tool in achieving equity and social progress.14 And yet human rights commentaries
often leave out taxation as a means of resource generation,15 and the human rights discourse is
only beginning to pay serious attention to the human rights effects of taxation policies.16
Transfer mispricing, as a specific and widespread form of tax abuse, both has its own set of
human rights implications and is illustrative of many of the human rights violations caused by
international tax abuse more generally. Tax abusive practices deprive states of resources
necessary to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill human rights.17 They slow the progress of the
right to development, subvert the right to self-determination, exacerbate social and economic
inequality, and damage governmental accountability. Transfer mispricing, in particular,
represents a failure of transparency, as well as a failure of states to fulfill their extra-territorial
human rights obligations and their human rights obligations as actors in the international
economic and social order.
By examining the human rights implications of transfer mispricing, this paper seeks to open
up new strategies for addressing this global problem and new ways of considering it. Part I of the
paper provides an overview of the mechanics of transfer mispricing and its effects, particularly in
the developing world. Part II discusses the ways in which transfer mispricing directly violates or
leads to the violation of a number of human rights and human rights principles. Finally, Part III
seeks to enhance the practical utility of this discussion by explaining some of the technical
solutions that are proposed for this global problem and suggesting some of the ways that a
human rights framework can be used to combat abusive transfer mispricing.

I. TRANSFER MISPRICING AND ITS EFFECTS
A. How does transfer mispricing work?
According to the principle of tax sovereignty, each state is entitled to set its own tax policy
without interference from others, resulting in potentially vast differences between the tax policy
and tax rates applied to components of TNCs located in different jurisdictions.18 Setting a lower
tax rate may allow a country “to enhance its competitive advantage in the marketplace for
12

See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, et al., Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice available at
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/optimal_taxation_in_theory.pdf.
13
IMF, IMF Policy Paper: Fiscal Policy and Income Equality, ¶ 30-39 (Jan. 23, 2014).
14
See CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS & CHRISTIAN AID, A POST-2015 FISCAL REVOLUTION: HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY BRIEF, at 5 (May 2014), http://www.cesr.org/downloads/fiscal.revolution.pdf. See also IMF, IMF
Policy Paper: Fiscal Policy and Income Equality, ¶ 34-35 (Jan. 23, 2014).
15
Ignacio Saiz, Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax Injustice from a Human Rights Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 81 (Aoife Nolan et al.
eds., 2013).
16
See LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 8-9 (“In general, stakeholders noted that tax abuses have not often been
approached from a human rights perspective; however, there are indications that this conversation about human
rights and tax is beginning.”).
17
Tax Justice Network Germany, “Taxes and Human Rights,” Policy Brief (Feb. 2013).
18
See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping
Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555 (2009).
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capital, investment, and/or nominal business presence.”19 However, these differing rates also
open up the possibility of cross-border tax manipulation.20 In order to avoid such manipulation
by TNCs, most countries have transfer pricing rules, the purpose of which “is to establish how
transactions within a multinational (the price that a subsidiary, for example, charges to the parent
company for specific components of a product) should be accounted for tax purposes.”21
The fact is that the various elements of a TNC “are not subject to the same market forces
shaping relations between two independent companies,” but, legally, these entities often get
treated like they are completely separate and independent, despite their behavior to the
contrary.22 Thus transfer pricing rules are generally quite easy to evade and to manipulate to the
tax benefit of the multinational and to the detriment of tax revenues.23 While a distinction is
often drawn between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance that takes advantages of
loopholes or of differences between the tax laws in different jurisdictions, this paper will follow
the practice of others in referring to “tax abuse” or “abusive practices” to capture actions that fall
on both sides of the line of technical legality.24 This is because while tax evasion and tax
avoidance may vary in their methods and legality, many of their consequences, particularly their
human rights effects, are similar and can be addressed with similar strategies.25 Further, transfer
mispricing, the particular form of tax abuse addressed by this paper, can be accomplished both
through legal and illegal means.
Transfer mispricing can take at least four different forms: export mispricing, import
mispricing, IP rights, and re-invoicing. They are all designed to have a number of effects related
to a company’s tax situation. The first, export mispricing, is where a “subsidiary of a company
avoids paying taxes in a relatively high-tax country by selling its products at a loss to a
subsidiary in a low-tax country, which then sells the product to final customers at market price
and yields the profit.”26 This form of transfer mispricing is illustrated by the actions of Glencore
in Zambia, described above. The second, import mispricing, occurs “where locally run
enterprises are able to shift profits to affiliates in countries offering lower levels of taxation
through…artificially inflating the price paid for intermediate products purchased from overseas
affiliates so as to lower stated local profits.”27 For example, ActionAid has chronicled how
global beer company SABMiller’s breweries in Ghana pay extremely high fees for “management
services” from a Swiss-based affiliate, thus lowering corporate profits within Ghana.28 Thirdly,
and increasingly commonly, companies will “store” their intellectual property rights in a
subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction and then charge affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions artificially
19

Ring, supra note 18, at 562.
See, e.g., id. at 564.
21
CLAUDIO RADAELLI, CREATING THE INTERNATIONAL TAX ORDER: TRANSFER PRICING AND THE SEARCH FOR
COORDINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY 3 (European University Institute Working Papers RSC 98/28 1998).
22
LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 28.
23
See, e.g., HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM AFRICA, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS 27-28
(2015) [hereinafter HLPIFFA].
24
See, e.g., LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 7. See also Carmona, supra note 10, at ¶ 3. See also EURODAD ET. AL.,
HIDDEN PROFITS: THE EU’S ROLE IN SUPPORTING AN UNJUST GLOBAL T AX SYSTEM 18 (2014),
http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546298-hidden-profits-the-eu-s-role-in-supporting-an-unjust-global-tax-system2014-.pdf (using “tax dodging” to the same effect).
25
LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 7.
26
Bohoslavsky, supra note 10, at ¶ 5.
27
Saiz, supra note 16, at 86.
28
ACTIONAID, CALLING TIME: WHY SABMILLER SHOULD STOP DODGING TAXES IN AFRICA 8 (2012).
20
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high rates for the use of that intellectual property.29 SABMiller, for example, holds the rights to
brands of beer sold in Africa in a Dutch company, to which African brewers must pay significant
royalties.30 Fourthly, and clearly illegal, re-invoicing,31 “occurs when goods leave a country of
export under one invoice, then the invoice is redirected to another jurisdiction…where the price
is altered, and then the revised invoice is sent to the importing country for clearing and payment
purposes.”32 Because of the illegal nature of these practices it is more difficult to point to specific
examples, but researchers have calculated that they lead to significant annual tax revenue losses,
particularly in developing countries.33
The existence of jurisdictions with particularly favorable terms of corporate taxation,
generally called tax havens, is crucial to corporations’ abilities to successfully engage in these
sorts of abusive practices. ActionAid estimates that “almost one in every two dollars of reported
corporate investment in developing countries is now being routed from or via a tax haven.”34
Further, “poor countries may be more vulnerable to this practice than wealthier ones: 46% of
reported cross-border investment into low- and lower-middle income countries in 2011 came
from tax havens, compared to 37% into upper-middle and high-income countries.”35 In addition
to having extremely low tax rates, many of these tax havens are also “secrecy jurisdictions,”
helping corporations to hide their incomes and investments. These secrecy jurisdictions, as well
as “the more widely condoned practices of corporate tax opacity” around the world are also key
to permitting the persistence of transfer mispricing.36 This opacity is characterized by a lack of
information on “beneficial ownership,” which is to say the details of corporate structure and who
really owns various international subsidiaries, and “the fact that companies are not required to
report systematically their income and activities on a country-by-country basis.”37
In addition to the increased likelihood of having investment or profits funneled through tax
havens, developing nations are also hampered by a typical lack of capacity of their tax authorities
to establish and enforce transfer pricing rules.38 In 2014, the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial
Flows from Africa found that “only three African countries had transfer pricing units in their
internal revenue services.”39 Developing country tax authorities may lack the information
required to make effective use of a system of tax information exchange.40 While such systems
are commonly cited as a potential solution to the problem of the lack of global tax transparency,
they can be complex and expensive, and technical reciprocity requirements often mean that

29

MARKUS HENN, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, TAX HAVENS AND THE TAXATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 5 (June 2013).
30
ACTIONAID, supra note 29, at 8.
31
See ANN HOLLINGSHEAD, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, THE IMPLIED TAX REVENUE LOSS FROM TRADE
MISPRICING (2010).
32
Id. at 1.
33
HOLLINGSHEAD, supra note 32, at 19.
34
ACTIONAID, supra note 9, at 8.
35
Id.
36
TAX JUSTICE NETWORK-AFRICA & CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 10, at 29.
37
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,
Magdalena Sepùlveda Carmona, ¶ 77, A/HRC/26/28 (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter Sepùlveda Carmona].
38
LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 30.
39
HLPIFFA, supra note 24, at 27.
40
Id. at 46. See also AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL, supra note 4, at 65.
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developing countries are blocked from participating.41 Accordingly, a power imbalance can be
created between countries with substantial capacity and information and those without, making
those without more vulnerable to transfer pricing activities.42
B. What is the global impact of transfer mispricing?
Transfer mispricing does significant damage to tax collection around the world and also has
wide-ranging economic and social effects beyond the lost revenue. A number of efforts have
been made to calculate the monetary loss that is incurred around the world and in particular
countries as a result of transfer mispricing. However, “since illicit financial flows are by
definition hidden, it is inevitable that estimates will be subject to substantial uncertainty.”43
Further, the complicated nature of the international financial system generally and transfer
pricing in particular can lead to variations in estimates, as choices are made about which
practices to include and how impacts are calculated.44
Still, while there may not be an exact figure available for the amount of money lost to
transfer mispricing, one widely-cited estimate suggests that transfer mispricing may cost
developing countries alone up to $160 billion each year,45 and a brief survey of the various
monetary estimates can help to give a sense of the magnitude of this problem. Since, as described
above, the burden of transfer mispricing falls more heavily on developing countries, much of the
study of the effects of transfer mispricing also focuses on these countries. In addition to the
capacity and vulnerability issues described above, transfer mispricing is also in some ways a
greater burden on developing countries because they are more reliant on corporate taxes,
particularly from TNCs: in developed countries, on average, corporate taxes constitute about ten
percent of total tax revenues,46 whereas in developing nations corporate taxes tend to make up
more than 25% of the tax base.47
The serious study of the question of the amounts lost to transfer mispricing was initiated in
2005 by Raymond Baker with the publication of his book, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty
Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System.48 One of Baker’s key insights was that
although issues like corruption and illegal trafficking tend to attract a good deal of attention, the
actual amount of money lost to these activities is dwarfed by the amounts lost to transfer
mispricing and other corporate tax evasion.49 Subsequent to that publication, Baker founded an
NGO, Global Financial Integrity (“GFI”), which studies IFFs and related policies. GFI has been

41

HLPIFFA, supra note 24, at 46, 59, 71-72.
DAVID MCNAIR ET AL., CHRISTIAN AID, TRANSFER PRICING, AND THE TAXING RIGHTS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 2 (2010).
43
Bohoslavsky, supra note 10, at ¶ 8.
44
See KAR & SPANJERS, supra note 6, at 3-6 (discussing GFI’s methodology for calculating illicit financial flows
and comparing to methods used by others).
45
CHRISTIAN AID, DEATH AND TAXES: THE TRUE TOLL OF TAX DODGING 5 (2008).
46
R.S. Avi-Yonah, Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals, 3 available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2344760 (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
47
Id. p. 4.
48
RAYMOND BAKER, CAPITALISM’S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND HOW TO RENEW THE FREE-MARKET
SYSTEM (2005).
49
See KAR & SPANJERS, supra note 6, at vii.
42
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publishing annual reports on IFFs out of developing countries over a ten-year period.50 Their
most recent study, cited above, “finds that between 2003 and 2012, the developing world lost US
$6.6 trillion in illicit outflows,” including US $991.2 billion in 2012 alone.51 Almost eighty
percent of these flows can be attributed to trade misinvoicing,52 which encompasses both the
kind of reinvoicing within multinationals described above and manipulated invoices when a
company sells to an unrelated entity. It is worth noting that the size of these flows has grown
almost every year that GFI has studied them, at an average of 9.4 percent each year.53
Even given global reductions in corporate tax rates and increased use of tax incentives to
attract foreign investment, the tax revenue lost from these outflows is substantial. Ann
Hollingshead, also working with GFI, estimates “that developing countries lost somewhere
between US $98 billion and US $107 billion per year in tax revenues between 2002 and 2006”
due to only a subset of transfer mispricing—re-invoicing.54 Another frequently cited estimate,
referenced above, comes from Christian Aid, which attempted to include all of the types of
transfer mispricing described in section I(a) above,55 and which calculated that transfer
mispricing and false invoicing cost the developing world $160 billion annually in tax revenues.56
Research has also focused on specific countries, geographic regions, or sectors. For example,
in Zambia, 2008 estimates suggest that nearly half of the national GDP was lost to transfer
mispricing of copper exports.57 In a study of five African countries from 2002-2011, GFI found
that “Ghana lost $386 million, Kenya lost $435 million, Mozambique lost $187 million,
Tanzania lost $248 million, and Uganda lost $243 million on average per year in potential tax
and tariff revenue during the ten-year period of the study.”58 Even in highly developed Norway,
a government study found that up to 30% of potential taxes due from foreign multinationals were
being lost to transfer mispricing.59 Former U.N. Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and
human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, noted that “the annual loss to Africa from transfer
mispricing has been estimated at $38 billion, higher than the flow of development assistance to
the region over the same period.”60
This last point is particularly important, that the magnitude and significance of the problem
of transfer mispricing are made more clear by considering the problem in the context of the
financial flows that are more frequently associated with developing nations: official development
aid (“ODA”) and debt. As GFI points out, “while African countries have had to shoulder a heavy
50

Global Financial Integrity, Reports, http://www.gfintegrity.org/reports/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 7.
54
HOLLINGSHEAD, supra note 32, at 14.
55
See CHRISTIAN AID, DEATH AND TAXES: THE TRUE TOLL OF TAX DODGING 53 (2008), available at
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/deathandtaxes.pdf.
56
Id. at 5.
57
Nicholas J. Lusiani, Only the Little People Pay Taxes: Tax Evasion and Switzerland’s Extraterritorial
Obligations to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in LITIGATING TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS: ALTERNATIVE JUDGMENTS 121 (Mark Gibney & Wouter Vandenhole, eds., 2014).
58
GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: TRADE MISINVOICING AND THE IMPACT OF REVENUE
LOSS IN GHANA, KENYA, MOZAMBIQUE, TANZANIA, AND UGANDA: 2002-11 vii (2014).
59
GUTTORM SCHJELDERUP ET AL., NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TAX HAVENS AND DEVELOPMENT
52 (2009).
60
Carmona, supra note 10, at ¶ 77.
51
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debt burden, a number of researchers…have shown that sustained illicit outflows have turned the
continent into a net creditor to the rest of the world.”61 Lusiani highlights the estimate that the
money lost in low and middle-income countries to IFFs in 2009 (more than sixty percent of
which was attributable to tax evasion) was more than ten times the value of the ODA sent to
those countries in that year.62
These revenue losses have broad effects on national budgets, economies, and societies.
Governments tend to try to make up for these lost revenues by increasing regressive taxes or
reducing spending on social welfare.63 O’Hare et al., studying IFFs generally, found that
curtailing such flows would have led to timely accomplishment of the fourth Millennium
Development Goal, a two-thirds reduction in the under-five mortality rate within sixteen SubSaharan African countries, and significant reductions in accomplishment time in eighteen
others.64 But social spending is not the only area of government expenditure affected. As
ActionAid asserts:
“[M]aking investment profitable in developing countries depends on
functioning infrastructure such as roads and airports, and on a healthy and
educated workforce. When global businesses and investors use tax haven
structures and offshore profits to avoid paying taxes in poor countries, they are
both undermining their own long-term financial prospects, and free-riding on
other individuals and businesses in developing countries that do not have
access to tax havens, and which shoulder an excessive share of the tax
burden.”65

Indeed, these effects go beyond government spending to distort economic power and income
distribution across the entire economy. Tax abuse by large international companies can
undermine efforts to give tax support to small and medium local businesses, giving rise to “the
missing middle,” an economy built primarily on large enterprises and extremely small, informal
ones.66 These practices create an edge for multinationals over local businesses,67 and local
partners of multinational corporations may also suffer from lost dividend payments and reduced
profitability.68 Tax-driven corporate behavior can also result in the “de-skilling of a sector or an
economy if high-value functions are offshored to low-tax jurisdictions,” 69 reduced local wages
or returns to local shareholders,70 and increased employment volatility.71

61

GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, supra note 59, at 6.
Lusiani, supra note 58, at 117.
63
Id. at 119.
64
Bernadette O’Hare et al., The Effect of Illicit Financial Flows on Time to Reach the Fourth Millennium
Development Goal in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Quantitative Analysis, 107 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 148-56 (2014).
“65 ACTIONAID, supra note 9, at 6.
66
CHRISTIAN AID, THE MISSING MILLIONS: THE COST OF TAX DODGING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SUPPORTED BY
THE SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT 3 (2009).
67
ACTIONAID, supra note 9, at 6.
68
Id. at 28.
69
ACTIONAID, RESPONSIBLE TAX PRACTICES BY COMPANIES: A MAPPING AND REVIEW OF CURRENT PROPOSALS 16
(2015).
70
Id.
71
Id.
62
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Further, transfer mispricing disproportionately impacts countries with significant
inequality.72 Abusive tax practices “make efforts to tax wealth largely ineffective and therefore
contribute directly to worsening income inequality.”73 GFI points out, “So long as illicit capital
continues to hemorrhage out of poor African countries over the long term at a rapid pace, efforts
to reduce poverty and boost economic growth will be thwarted as income distribution becomes
ever more skewed leading to economic and political instability.”74 As discussed above, the bulk
of the illicit capital outflows studied by GFI are attributable to transfer mispricing.
As that quote suggests, beyond the economy, transfer mispricing can be detrimental to
security and trust. Cobham describes, “a growing base of evidence on the linkages; in particular,
[between transfer mispricing and similar IFFs and] ‘positive security’ (the ability of states to
provide secure conditions in which rapid human development can take place).”75 He points out
that “a vicious cycle is possible: [IFFs] undermine the resources available to states, and their
effectiveness (and often willingness) to use resources for broad-based development, undermining
human development outcomes; while weak institutions and a lack of confidence in fair political
representation encourage further [IFFs].”76 What is more, “the legal use by a multinational of
highly secretive jurisdictions may both provide cover for illegal use of the same secrecy, and also
inadvertently legitimize such behaviour.”77 In addition to its primary purpose of reducing taxes
paid by corporations, transfer mispricing can be used “as a technique for money laundering …
capital flight, and import duty fraud.”78 Thus this is another vicious cycle: “economic growth
without credible [tax] reform could lead to more, not less, capital flight, as the increase in
incomes would simply finance the increased accumulation of foreign assets.”79

II. TRANSFER MISPRICING AS A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
From the above it is evident that transfer mispricing has significant negative effects on
economic growth, social services, and security as well as revenue collection. But how is this a
human rights issue rather than simply a question of economics and policy? In fact, transfer
mispricing leads to violations of a number of international human rights laws and instruments,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the Declaration on the Right to Development. This section
illustrates how transfer mispricing violates human rights law, as laid out in the texts of
international human rights treaties, declarations, and other instruments of soft and hard law.
Mispricing reduces the resources available for human rights, impedes the rights to development
and self-determination, and damages efforts to ensure equality, non-discrimination,
accountability, and transparency. States, by allowing transfer mispricing, are failing to live up to
72
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their human rights responsibilities as actors in a global community. Section III will turn to the
utility of approaching transfer mispricing from a human rights perspective.
A. Transfer mispricing keeps states from devoting maximum
available resources to human rights.
Perhaps the most immediately obvious impact of transfer mispricing on human rights is that
the practice deprives the government of revenues that could be spent instead on respecting,
promoting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights obligations. This is especially relevant in the
context of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR,80 under which “Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”81 This
requirement is also echoed in Article 4 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).82
The questions of what it means to devote “maximum available resources” to the realization
of human rights, or of what it means to “progressively achieve” that realization are sources of
much debate within and outside the human rights community.83 However, one certainty is that,
despite the claims of some critics, the flexibility of progressive realization does not deprive
economic, social, and cultural rights of any real meaning or obligation.84 To the contrary, the
committee charged with interpreting the ICESCR and monitoring its implementation has held
that states do have an immediate obligation under the Covenant to provide minimum essential
levels of the rights therein.85 It is also worth noting that while these questions are primarily
discussed in relation to economic, social, and cultural rights, owing in large part to the
differences in language between Article 2 of the ICESCR and the corresponding article in the
ICCPR, the question of allocation of state resources is essential to the realization of all human
rights, as realization of civil and political rights is only possible through the funding of
government institutions including an adequate independent judiciary, a well-trained and wellregulated police force, and free and fair elections.86 To this point, and relevant specifically not
only to resources generally, but to taxation in particular, a former U.N. Special Rapporteur on
80
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extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions chronicled how inadequate revenue collection
and allocation contributed to a broken criminal justice system and a culture of impunity in
Guatemala, saying: “The lack of resources is due to a lack of political will: rather than funding a
high-quality criminal justice system, Congress has decided to impose very low levels of taxation
and, thus, to starve the criminal justice system and other parts of Government.”87
While the concept of maximum available resources has not yet been completely defined by
the law and commentary, a body of interpretation by courts and commentators suggests that it
requires efficient and equitable action by the state.88 Good fiscal policy, including effective
taxation, is essential to efficient and equitable government action, and “is one of the key policy
instruments states have to shape the conditions in which all human rights…can be fulfilled.”89 As
elaborated in the U.N.’s Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty: “States should make certain
that adequate resources are raised and used to ensure the realization of the human rights of
persons living in poverty. Fiscal policies, including in relation to revenue collection, budget
allocations and expenditure, must comply with human rights standards and principles, in
particular equality and non-discrimination.”90 The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child
has also notably recognized that a failure to combat tax evasion and to ensure a functioning
system of tax collection can interfere with a state’s ability to allocate sufficient resources to
human rights protection and implementation.91
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the collection of taxes is only one part of what must
be done to fulfill states’ obligations under Article 2 of the ICESCR and other human rights
instruments. As the IBAHRI emphasizes, “a full discussion of the human rights implications of
tax abuses requires not only an examination of the state’s obligations as a tax collector, but also
an examination of its obligations in terms of allocating and spending increased tax revenues.”92
In other words, revenue must not only be made available, it must be used for the realization of
human rights. This has led a number of human rights actors to study resource allocation issues,
including examining topics like human rights budgeting,93 and questions of allocation have been
the focus of litigation over maximum available resources, notably in South Africa, where the
concept of available resources for rights is enshrined in the constitution.94 Still, the collection of
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Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/20/Add. 2 (Feb. 19, 2007).
88
John Southalan, What Are the Implications of Human Rights for Minerals Taxation? 36 RESOURCES POL’Y 214,
217 (2011).
89
Saiz, supra note 16, at 80. In addition to allocation of adequate resources, Saiz identifies two other functions of
taxation in relation to human rights: income redistribution and enforcing accountability – these will be discussed in
later sections.
90
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Human Rights), Final Draft of the
Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty & Human Rights, ¶ 53 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/39 (July 18, 2012)[hereinafter
“Guiding Principles”].
91
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Georgia, ¶¶ 18-19, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.124
(June 28, 2000).
92
LIPSETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 116; see also AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL, supra note 4, at 66-68.
93
See RADHIKA BALAKRISHNAN ET AL. CTR. FOR WOMEN’S GLOB. LEADERSHIP, MAXIMUM AVAILABLE RESOURCES
& HUMAN RIGHTS: ANALYTICAL REPORT 2-3 (2011).
94
See, e.g., Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2001) 1 SA 46 (CC) ¶ 46 (S. Afr.).

11

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[2017

adequate resources is an important precondition for the proper allocation of those resources, and
tax and fiscal policy are an important component of resource mobilization.95
These questions are particularly relevant in an era when countries around the world, at all
stages of development, are experiencing fiscal contractions and moving towards instituting
austerity measures with significant impact on the realization of all human rights, and particularly
economic and social rights, both because of domestic policy choices and because of international
pressure to adopt such measures. As a network of European NGOs pointed out in 2013,
“currently, 98 countries have introduced or are considering wage bill caps or cuts, including in
the education and public health sectors; 86 are working on pension ‘reforms’; 80 countries are
reconsidering their safety nets; and 100 countries are revising and reducing subsidies, including
on food products. Meanwhile large amounts of wealth are still escaping the tax net through tax
evasion and tax avoidance.”96 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which
interprets and monitors the ICESCR, has recognized the threat that austerity measures can pose
to the realization of human rights, especially for the most vulnerable, and has written an open
letter to member states on the subject, calling on them to ensure that policies “comprise all
possible measures, including tax measures, to support social transfers to mitigate inequalities that
can grow in times of crisis and to ensure that the rights of the disadvantaged and marginalized
individuals and groups are not disproportionately affected.”97
Issues surrounding adequate revenue collection and allocation matter in particular to
developing countries, where, as discussed above, tax enforcement may be weaker and the tax
base may be significantly smaller, limiting the availability of government resources and the
possibilities for maximizing them.98 On average, low-income country tax revenues represent
only about thirteen percent of GDP, compared to an average of thirty-six percent in the OECD
countries.99 As a European NGO coalition has recognized, “in developing countries the impacts
of the missing tax revenues are felt directly by the world’s poorest people, who depend on their
public sector to provide education, healthcare and basic social services.”100 A number of actors
have calculated exactly what these missing revenues mean for the fulfillment of economic,
social, and cultural rights in the developing world and in specific developing countries. For
example, ActionAid has variously estimated that the money lost by developing countries to tax
avoidance and evasion constitutes “three times the estimated cost of the agricultural investment
needed to achieve a world free from hunger, and twelve times the cost of ending the global
scourge of malnutrition,”101 and that recovery of this money “would raise government spending
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enough to reduce child deaths in the developing world by 230 children every day.”102 GFI
estimates that if Ghana had used all of the money lost to trade mispricing for poverty reduction,
the poverty reduction budget in that country could have been increased by 21.4% in 2011,103 and
that, “had the government [of Mozambique] been successful in curtailing trade misinvoicing by
50 percent, it would have been able to expand its social program by nearly 36 percent, which
represents a significant loss in its fight to alleviate poverty.”104
B. Transfer mispricing impedes the fulfillment of the right to development.
Another right violated by transfer mispricing is the right to development, as elaborated in the
1986 United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (“DRD”). The DRD defines the
right to development as “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and
all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully
realized.”105 Thus it enshrines a vision of development that is people-centered and concerned
with improving lives for individuals, communities, and entire populations, rather than
exclusively focused on economic growth. It promotes development that is characterized by free,
active, and meaningful participation of all individuals, communities, and states and the fair
distribution of the benefits of that development.106 While the DRD is not a binding legal
instrument, it incorporates many of the rights and principles contained in other human rights
documents,107 and explicitly emphasizes the indivisibility of all human rights.108 It is a right that
is recognized in a number of international instruments and in states around the world, and that is
justiciable in the African human rights system.109 Thus it could potentially form the basis for a
legal case in the African human rights system, as discussed in Section III(b) below, and is also a
potential advocacy tool.
The vision of human-centered economic and social development enshrined in the DRD is
clearly impeded by transfer mispricing.110 The tax revenues lost through transfer mispricing can
be spent on social programs, as discussed above, but can also be devoted to development efforts.
Article 2 of the DRD calls for fair and equitable sharing in development, which can be
accomplished in part through the redistributive function of taxation.111 Article 8 of the DRD
102
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requires states to “undertake…all necessary measures for the realization of the right to
development,” including adopting appropriate fiscal policy.112 Further, it is important to
recognize that tax avoidance through transfer mispricing means not just lost tax revenues, but
also lost profits that might be locally reinvested and thus spur local development and growth,113
and that tax abuses by TNCs can have detrimental effects on local economies, as described in
Section I(b) above.
C. Transfer mispricing undermines the right to self-determination.
The right of all peoples to self-determination is a basic and fundamental right in the
international system, so important as to constitute the common first article of the ICCPR and the
ICESCR.114 This article in its first paragraph establishes that “All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.”115 As the former Special Rapporteur on
extreme poverty and human rights has underlined, this language “has clear implications for
activities that undermine the ability of other States to raise revenue and fund their own
development.”116 This notion is closely linked to the principle of sovereignty, which is at the
heart of international relations and the structure of the United Nations and key to the manner in
which states interact and cooperate.117
However, in an increasingly globalized world, notions of sovereignty are challenged at every
turn, and the global tax system is a potent illustration both of how sovereignty has been eroded
and how its invocation can be abused. International tax cooperation efforts have been frustrated
by an emphasis on tax sovereignty, the idea that each state should set its own tax policy without
any interference from others. However, at the same time, through a combination of structural
adjustment requirements, power imbalances, the global “race to the bottom” on corporate tax
rates in order to encourage investment, and the sort of international tax mismatches that enable
transfer mispricing, this tax sovereignty is in reality non-existent for a number of countries.118 As
Saiz explains, “national-level policies are shaped and constrained by trends in the international
tax policy framework.”119 And the revenue lost through weak tax policies and tax enforcement
can erode sovereignty in other policy areas. “[T]axation . . . allows the government more policy
space and capacity to be responsive and accountable to national objectives that are not tainted by
the conditionalities of foreign aid.”120 As the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows in
Africa noted:
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“Given the well-known dependence of several African countries on significant
amounts of official development assistance, the loss of resources through IFFs
can only serve to deepen reliance on donors. Such dependence is apparent not
only in terms of funds to support the social sector and state institutions, but also
in terms of development ideas. It is an established fact that despite assertions of
ownership, development policy very often reflects the perspectives of creditors
or donors. Thus, when strapped for resources, African countries can often find
themselves at the receiving end of externally imposed ideas that might not
really be in their own perceived interests.”121

The second paragraph of common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR holds that “All
peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the
principle of mutual benefit, and international law.”122 Inherent in this language is the idea that
the natural wealth and resources of a state should be employed to the social benefit of the people
of that state. This element of the right to self-determination is also threatened by transfer
mispricing, when TNCs involved in extraction of natural resources use abusive practices to avoid
paying taxes on the profits of that extraction in the country of origin.123 As referenced above, a
key example of this possibility is Zambia, which Lusiani notes lost a total amount of capital
equivalent to half of its GDP, and the accompanying tax revenues, as a result of transfer
mispricing of copper exports in 2008.124 As the Tax Justice Network-Africa and Christian Aid
summarize, “[d]espite the huge potential, the income capture by sub-Saharan governments from
their natural resource sector is extremely low. It is a far from fair share of the wealth extracted
from the country; a disproportionate share of the benefits goes to the multinational companies
who extract and sell the resource.”125
D. Transfer mispricing erodes equality and non-discrimination.
Key to fulfilling states’ human rights obligations and included almost universally in human
rights instruments are the principles of equality and non-discrimination.126 These principles
require that states act in particular to protect and advance historically marginalized or vulnerable
groups, including women, children, persons with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, and
those living in extreme poverty. States that do not adequately address issues of tax evasion may
be unable to fund social programs and thus may entrench persistent social inequalities.127 As a
global coalition of 157 NGOs declared in 2015, “[t]axation…plays a fundamental role in
redistributing resources in ways that can prevent and redress gender, economic and other
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inequalities and reduce the disparities in human rights enjoyment that flow from them.”128
“[A]ddressing inequality depends on a society’s willingness to reduce social disparities by
financing equitable policies through taxes and investments. Addressing equity is at the center of
the social contract between governments and citizens: how much a society is willing to
redistribute and how to do so.”129 The High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa
summarizes the damage that IFFs can do to these rights, stating:
“The social consequences of IFFs extend … to the worsening inequality in
Africa. Our earlier observation that IFFs contribute to a regressive tax system
and impose an unfair tax burden on poorer sections of society is pertinent in
this regard. IFFs contribute to worsening inequality in Africa in other ways as
well. The provision of social services and social protection schemes are means
of reducing inequality. African governments find it increasingly harder to
provide these forms of support in increasingly constrained economic
circumstances.”130

Tax injustice does not only contribute to increasing broad social and economic inequalities
between rich and poor, but is also particularly likely to impact vulnerable and traditionally
marginalized groups, who may have a history of exclusion from economic and social opportunity
and who may rely on non-discriminatory government services in order to remedy past and
present injustices. Persons with disabilities and women are two groups that are more likely to be
reliant on government social and health services that suffer when revenues are inadequate,131 and
two groups that rely on such services to provide a base for a move from historic
disenfranchisement to lasting economic empowerment.132
Additionally, it is not just how much tax revenue is collected that matters for questions of
equality and non-discrimination, but also how those taxes are collected and from whom. “Tax
reforms promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in developing countries
since the 1980’s have tended to favor the introduction or expansion of indirect taxation (in
particular through value added taxes or VAT) and reductions in the rates of corporate and
personal income taxation.”133 This tends to have the effect of shifting the tax burden more
towards the poor and marginalized.134 Specifically in the gender context, Elson’s analysis shows
that “if tax paid by corporations falls and by persons rises…the incidence of tax on women,
especially poor women, will tend to increase.”135 When states fail to address transfer mispricing,
they fail to live up to their human rights obligations to the principles of equality and nondiscrimination, both by underfunding social protection programs and by shifting the burden for
paying for those programs onto those who are most in need.
128
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E. Transfer mispricing damages accountability and transparency.
International human rights law includes a set of human rights principles that must guide
government policy-making in all arenas and that are integral to good governance. As the former
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights has emphasized, “[t]he rights to
participation, accountability, transparency, and access to information are critical human rights
principles that also apply to fiscal policies.”136 This requirement, rooted in states’ international
human rights commitments, means, among other things, that tax policies should be open to
judicial oversight137 and that public officials should be accountable for fiscal decisions that
imperil human rights.138 Unfortunately, many of the policies that enable transfer mispricing not
only fail to respect these basic requirements, but also act to undermine essential human rights
principles in a number of ways.
As Cobham explains:
“Effective taxation provides 4 R’s: not only revenue, and the opportunity to
reprice social goods and bads, but redistribution and political representation.
Taxation should provide both the funds and the means to redistribute in order
to address important deficits in positive security. In addition, however, taxation
provides a critical link to effective political representation and wider standards
of governance.”139

In other words, a just and fair tax system contributes to broader governance goals through
common interest processes, by which governments have incentives to promote growth because
they are dependent on taxes; state capacity processes, in which tax revenue enables the creation
of effective bureaucracy; and citizen engagement, which encourages greater accountability.140
Perhaps the human rights and good governance principle most implicated by transfer
mispricing is transparency, because transfer mispricing is fundamentally a problem of
transparency,141 and a violation of the right to information, as embodied in Article 19 of the
ICCPR.142 Transfer mispricing is enabled by secrecy about corporate profits, assets, and
ownership, and by lack of effective information sharing between the different jurisdictions in
which corporations operate. As a result, these corporations have an incentive to use their political
and economic power to combat efforts to bring greater transparency and participation to the
global tax system.143 Thus the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa has asserted:
“We believe that transparency is key to all efforts to arrest IFFs, given that the primary aim of
perpetrators is to hide wealth.”144 Accordingly that panel has advocated for better corporate
136
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reporting and better exchange of information between countries.145 Such policy changes would
be consistent with transparency as a human rights principle.
Additionally, a number of commentators have noted that a just and efficient tax system
includes an accountability function.146 Taxation is a manifestation of the social contract, and
therefore encourages government accountability and citizen oversight. Cobham explains: “The
act of paying tax provides an important accountability link. Empirical studies suggest the higher
the share of tax in government spending, the stronger the process of improving governance and
representation; while direct tax – taxes on income, profits and capital gains – appears to play a
particularly strong role.”147 As a result, abusive tax practices like transfer mispricing damage
accountability “by generating a revenue escape valve.”148 Tax imbalances often reflect broader
democratic deficits.149 Further, corporations that seek to engage in abusive tax practices will
sometimes engage in bribery and other corrupt practices in order to perpetuate these activities,
thus contributing to “entrenched impunity and the institutionalization of corruption.”150
F. Transfer mispricing violates states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations
and obligations as members of the international community.
There is an obligation on all states, stemming from their human rights commitments, to
strengthen their own domestic tax revenue collection and to work together to address the global
problem of transfer mispricing in service of making sufficient resources available such that all
human rights can be realized for all. The discussion in this section thus far has implicitly
emphasized the domestic human rights obligations of states in collecting and distributing taxes.
However, transfer mispricing is by its very nature an international problem and implicates states’
obligations of international cooperation and their responsibilities to one another and to each
other’s citizens. In other words, transfer mispricing is an example of a human rights violation
that gives rise to extraterritorial human rights obligations (“ETO”). While each state is primarily
responsible for human rights issues within its own territory, the interconnectedness of today’s
globalized world means that these obligations cannot end at national borders. ETOs are grounded
in the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, the ICESCR, and a number of other human rights treaties and
instruments.151 They are articulated in the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of
States in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which are non-binding, but gather
the principles found in binding instruments, and which describe the obligation of states to
“desist from acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of
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economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially,”152 and to take steps to ensure that TNCs
that they are in a position to regulate do not violate or impair these rights.153
A number of actors have enumerated the relevance of ETOs for global taxation issues. As
Lusiani argues, under the ICESCR, “no State is permitted to infringe on another State’s ability to
mobilize the resources necessary for fulfilling Covenant rights, including through fiscal and tax
policy.”154 Thus, the former Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights advises:
“The actions of States to facilitate and/or actively promote tax abuse and other
illicit financial flows through their tax secrecy laws and policies could
jeopardize their compliance with international human rights obligations,
particularly with regard to international cooperation and economic, social and
cultural rights. States should therefore take concerted and coordinated
measures against tax evasion globally as part of their domestic and
extraterritorial human rights obligations and their duty to protect people from
human rights violations by third parties, including business enterprises . . . .”155

Article 28 of the UDHR holds that “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”156 Article 3(3)
of the DRD operationalizes this requirement, by calling on states “to promote a new international
economic order based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and cooperation
among all States, as well as to encourage the observation and realization of human rights.”157
State responsibility to contribute to the formation of this order “can be derived from several
factors, including a State’s global economic weight and capacity; a State’s relative power and
influence over the direction of finance, trade and development; and the degree to which a State
benefits from the existing distribution of global wealth and resources.”158 Human rights laws
entail an obligation to provide a supranational institutional design that is conducive to the
fulfilment of human rights and the reduction of poverty.159 The U.N.’s Guiding Principles on
Extreme Poverty elaborate on this obligation, insisting that “States must take deliberate, specific
and targeted steps, individually and jointly, to create an international enabling environment
conducive to poverty reduction, including in matters relating to bilateral and multilateral trade,
investment, taxation, finance, environmental protection and development cooperation.”160
Permitting transfer mispricing is an example of a violation of the obligation to create an
international global order that is conducive to fulfillment of human rights and the reduction of
152
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poverty,161 and a symptom of an international system that is currently inequitable and unjust. It is
state action that makes it so. Bilateral tax treaties currently tend to aggravate transfer mispricing
issues by allocating tax rights in a manner that is detrimental to developing countries and by
lowering taxation of cross-border financial transfers.162 Tax laws can give rise to “inequality
spirals,” where those in positions of strength are able to reinforce that strength through greater
access.163 Even in their efforts to actually address this problem, thus far, developed country
governments have supported the OECD taking the lead on transfer mispricing issues, despite the
limited role that this implies for developing country governments,164 and the OECD’s own
admission that developing country priorities may not be emphasized in its approach.165 The
responsibility to create a just social and economic order impels states to generate a human rightsconscious framework for all aspects of foreign direct investment (“FDI”),166 including the way in
which corporations making those investments are taxed. Thus far, contrary to the urging of the
UDHR, they have failed to do so.167
Inextricably linked to the creation of a just social and international order and equally relevant
to the issue of transfer mispricing is the requirement of international cooperation for the
realization of human rights. This principle is laid out in the very first article of the UDHR, which
holds that “[a]ll human beings…should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood,”168
and given legal force in Article 2 of the ICESCR, which includes a requirement that states act
through international assistance and cooperation to progressively realize human rights.169 It is
more fully fleshed out in articles 3 and 4 of the DRD, which require that states demonstrate full
respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation
among states, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,170 and that they cooperate
with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development, in
formulating international development policies, in creating national and international conditions
favorable to the realization of the right to development, in encouraging the observance and
realization of human rights, and in promoting a new international economic order based on
sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and cooperation among all states.171 In
Article 4, the Declaration also calls for sustained action for more rapid development of
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developing countries and effective international cooperation to provide them with appropriate
means and facilities to foster their comprehensive development.172
The Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty, after calling on states to create an international
enabling order for human rights, emphasize that “this includes cooperating to mobilize the
maximum of available resources for the universal fulfillment of human rights.”173 Similarly, the
Committee on Economic and Social Rights ended an open letter to States Parties with the
reminder “that international cooperation is a fundamental obligation for the progressive universal
realization of economic, social and cultural rights.”174 More broadly, a U.N. Secretary-General’s
Report explains:
“In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country’s
self-interest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of
larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global
cooperation among States. Such cooperation is possible if every country’s
policies take into account not only the needs of its own citizens but also the
needs of others. This kind of cooperation not only advances everyone’s
interests but also recognizes our common humanity.”175

The problem of transfer mispricing is a vivid illustration of the critical need for international
cooperation to achieve the realization of all human rights, including the right to development.
Tax abuse of this sort is an inherently international problem that “is not possible in a domestic
vacuum.”176 The Africa Progress Panel has explained: “Tax evasion is a global problem that
requires multilateral solutions. Africa cannot combat tax evasion solely through national and
regional policy.”177 They point to tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions, and the complexities of TNC
structures as cross-border problems.178 Thus they insist: “Far more than increased aid, what
Africa needs is strengthened international cooperation so that it can secure a fair share of the
wealth now being drained out of the region through unfair and sometimes illegal practices.”179
International problems that cannot be solved unilaterally by any one country or region are among
the stated purposes for the existence of the United Nations,180 and Articles 1, 55, and 56 of the
U.N. Charter require international cooperation to solve them.181
In sum, transfer mispricing undermines states’ abilities to fulfill their human rights
obligations in a number of different areas. It is inimical to principles of human rights and good
governance and represents a failure of international cooperation and global governance. It
impedes states’ abilities to fully benefit from their own resources and restricts the policy space
available to create an enabling environment for fair, equitable, and sustainable development. And
it is both a symptom and a cause of an unjust global economic and social order that leads to
172
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systemic violations of the human rights of people living in poverty all over the world.182 The
good news is that understanding transfer mispricing as a human rights violation may open up
new avenues to combat these practices, and this is what we turn to in the next section.

III. COMBATING TRANSFER MISPRICING USING HUMAN RIGHTS
Transfer mispricing is widely recognized as a global problem, damaging to governments,
economies, and human rights around the world.183 Naturally a number of academics, activists,
and policy-makers have proposed potential solutions to this problem, notably led by the Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Project at the OECD.184 However, there is no broad
consensus on the best actions for the global community to take to combat these and other tax
abuses. The solutions proposed by the OECD are criticized as too weak,185 but more incisive
actions have failed to gather widespread support.186 This section of the paper describes some of
the proposed technical and legal strategies for addressing transfer mispricing and then proposes
that analyzing transfer mispricing from a human rights perspective may offer a way forward in
the debate around how to address the problem, less by proposing new solutions than by opening
up new fora in which those solutions can be discussed and new perspectives for viewing them, as
well as increasing public pressure on policy-makers.
A. Proposed strategies for combating transfer mispricing.
The main strategy that countries around the world use to avoid the problem of transfer
mispricing is the requirement and enforcement of the “arm’s length method,” as advocated by
the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines.187 The essential thrust of the arm’s length principle is
that for tax purposes companies should treat related enterprises as separate businesses and should
set prices at market rates, in the same manner that they would with an unrelated entity.188 Thus,
for example, when Glencore’s mine in Zambia sells copper to its affiliate in Switzerland, for tax
purposes the Zambian government would consider the copper to have been sold at the market
price that Glencore would have received from selling the copper to an unrelated buyer, and tax
the Zambian subsidiary accordingly.
However, this method can be difficult to use for sophisticated transactions, for certain goods
and services it is not possible to establish a market price, and it can be hard to account for
intangible goods, like intellectual property, using this method.189 To return again to prior
examples, it is very difficult to calculate what SABMiller’s breweries in Ghana might have paid
to an outside company for the right to use the Castle beer brand, or for an amorphous set of
182
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management services. In order to account for these failings, Brazil has instituted a set of reforms
whereby, “when dealing with intra-firm trade in areas lacking comparable prices, tax authorities
will determine a price through a credible institution, or relevant price on a commodities
exchange, and apply it to the transactions in question. All companies trading from Brazil through
low tax jurisdictions will be subject to the new regime.”190
While some reformers suggest following the Brazilian model, others seek to replace the
arm’s length method entirely, advocating instead a system known as worldwide unitary taxation,
by which taxes are apportioned among jurisdictions where a multinational corporation operates
according to the activity that the corporation conducts within each jurisdiction.191 Thus in the
case of SABMiller’s Ghana breweries, it might be determined, for example, that seventy percent
of the activity to produce the products comes from the actual brewing in Ghana, twenty percent
comes from the holding and developing of the brand in the Netherlands, and ten percent from the
management services provided in Switzerland. Accordingly, Ghana would be able to levy tax on
seventy percent of the group’s profits, the Netherlands on twenty percent, and Switzerland on ten
percent, each according to the tax rates established by domestic law. In this way the
corporation’s income is taxed without reference to its internal organization, eliminating
incentives to shift profit within the corporation.192 However, this system could be complex to
implement, and might still involve iniquities.193 Notably, this is not a system that can be
enforced unilaterally; as suggested by the name, there must be a worldwide commitment to the
imposition of unitary taxation,194 and right now there is very little enthusiasm for the idea among
the governments of OECD countries.195 This is because the current global system of allocation of
taxing rights favors the “home” countries where TNCs are based over the “source” countries
where they invest, and thus developed nations stand to lose from a more equitable system.196
Further, this system places higher disclosure requirements on corporations, as it can best be
supported by country-by-country reporting of financial and tax information.197
Even without imposing an entirely new global transfer pricing system, there are a number of
reforms that have been proposed that could serve to make the current system more fair and
effective. Saiz notes that “growing advocacy by groups such as the Tax Justice Network has
prompted stronger international commitments to clamp down on tax havens and secrecy
jurisdictions, to foster progressive and transparent tax systems, and to ensure greater
international cooperation on tax, regulation and crime.”198 One potential method of securing this
greater international cooperation would be the establishment of a U.N. intergovernmental body
on tax issues,199 which was the subject of strong but ultimately unsuccessful lobbying by
190
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developing countries at the Addis Ababa Financing for Development Conference in July 2015.200
Saiz also suggests the possible imposition of international minimum corporate tax rates.201 While
this proposal is primarily aimed at preventing a “race to the bottom” as countries compete to
attract foreign investment, it would also serve to minimize some of the incentives to shift profits
from one jurisdiction to another.
As referenced above, the OECD, through its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”)
project, is working to address the harm caused by transfer mispricing. Key elements of this effort
include a move to requiring country-by-country reporting by multinationals,202 as well as
eliminating the possibility of holding intellectual property in low-tax jurisdictions where
companies have no other real presence, and facilitating information exchanges between
nations.203 However, the BEPS project has been criticized for the lack of meaningful
participation of developing countries, undue private sector influence, assumptions that privilege
developed country interests and the potential for continued gaps and loopholes.204 Indeed, even
the Director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration acknowledges that the
priorities of developing countries are not a primary concern for the BEPS project. 205 There is
ultimately a sense among those who advocate for tax justice that despite significant rhetoric
around the issue of transfer mispricing, governments, especially in developed countries, have not
really acted to take the steps that might remedy the problem.206 This is both a reason why transfer
mispricing constitutes a human rights violation and why it might be useful to use a human rights
frame to address this problem.
B. Human rights enforcement mechanisms can increase pressure on
states to address transfer mispricing.
The international human rights system encompasses a number of mechanisms for addressing
violations of human rights, with varying degrees of enforcement capabilities. On the soft power
end of the spectrum are the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, which are
empowered to make country visits and to present country and thematic reports to the Council.207
As has been referenced several times throughout this paper, both the current and former Special
Rapporteurs on extreme poverty and human rights have shown particular interest in issues of tax
policy, including transfer mispricing.208 The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health has also recognized
200
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tax evasion and reduced tax revenues as having a direct impact on the allocation of sufficient
resources for health.209 Additionally, the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and
other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human
rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, recently completed a report on illicit
financial flows, human rights, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that covers
transfer mispricing and its relation to human rights.210
Another mechanism that has gained increasing attention in recent years is the Universal
Periodic Review (“UPR”), a process by which states report regularly to the Human Rights
Council regarding their efforts to fulfil their human rights obligations.211 Civil society is able to
contribute through stakeholder submissions and by lobbying states.212 States are given the
opportunity to question other states about their human rights situation, and the Council issues a
set of recommendations.213 As the IBAHRI report suggests, there is “no reason that” tax issues
should not be raised through the UPR.214 In fact, a Swiss NGO coalition included Switzerland’s
failure to adequately regulate multinational corporations in its submission to the Council during
Switzerland’s most recent UPR process,215 and similar considerations could be raised during the
UPR process for other states whose tax policy is viewed as facilitating transfer mispricing. Other
U.N. human rights treaty bodies, which are charged with monitoring the implementation of the
various human rights treaties, have similar review processes in which such issues can be
raised.216 For example, in 2016 a coalition of NGOs submitted a report prior to Switzerland’s
review before the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women highlighting
the effects that Switzerland’s role in cross border tax abuse have for women’s rights and gender
equality.217
Additionally, there is the possibility of raising a formal complaint before one of the treaty
bodies, which generally have some capacity to hear both individual and inter-state complaints.
Lusiani suggests the possibility of an inter-state complaint against a tax haven before the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, offering the example of a complaint
brought by Zambia against Switzerland.218 His imagined action relies on the obligations of
parties to the ICESCR to refrain from actions or omissions that impair the enjoyment of human
rights, to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, and to cooperate and assist in
mobilizing maximum available resources.219 However, while Lusiani presents an interesting, and
certainly theoretically valid proposal, the reality is that there is very little political will to bring
209
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inter-state complaints within the U.N. human rights system.220 Individual complaints are more
feasible, but are generally only allowed against states that have ratified certain optional protocols
to the various treaties, and are limited to violations that occur within national boundaries,221
limiting the possibility of addressing the transnational scourge of transfer mispricing.
Finally, there is the possibility of using regional human rights courts. This may be
particularly relevant in the African system where a great deal of evidence has been accumulated
about the impact of transfer mispricing, and where, as referenced above, the right to development
is fully justiciable.222 However, this option would only allow for complaints against African
states, again, failing to address the transnational character of transfer mispricing. Still, it is
possible to imagine a state under the influence of corporate power failing to act to the best of its
independent abilities to limit transfer mispricing, and this situation could provide a basis for
public interest litigation in the regional courts.
C. Businesses should incorporate transfer mispricing and other
tax issues in their human rights policies.
With the rise of globalization and the power of TNCs and the erosion of state sovereignty,
issues of the impacts of businesses on human rights and their accountability for human rights
violations have become hot topics in the global human rights arena.223 This debate is relevant to
questions of transfer mispricing, which, while enabled by state action and policy, is ultimately a
corporate act. The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, developed by John
Ruggie, then the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, and adopted by the Human Rights
Council in 2011, lay out a “Respect, Protect, and Remedy” framework that calls on businesses to
respect human rights in their dealings and on states to take action to protect against violations of
human rights by businesses both within and outside of their borders.224
The former Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights has very clearly
explained how this framework applies in the context of taxation of TNCs. With regard to state
obligations, she says:
“that States should take steps to prevent violations of human rights outside of
their territories as a result of the activities of business enterprises that are
incorporated under their laws or that have their main seat or place of business
under their jurisdiction. For example, States should take measures to ensure
that business enterprises that the State is in a position to regulate, including
220
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legal, accounting and other specialized firms that assist in tax abuse, do not
participate in or facilitate tax abuse or illicit financial flows, given that they
have a detrimental impact on the realization of economic, social and cultural
rights.”225

And regarding business obligations, she adds,
“[M]oreover, under the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
business enterprises also have a responsibility to respect human rights . . . .
Business practices that avoid taxation may breach their responsibility to respect
insofar as such actions have a negative human rights impact . . . . In addition,
business enterprises that knowingly avoid paying tax are purposefully
depriving countries of the resources they need to fulfil their human rights
obligations.”226

To this end, the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt has suggested that “one
obvious way for business enterprises to show responsible behaviour and demonstrate compliance
is to embrace a greater degree of transparency, in particular by publishing on a country-bycountry basis their sales, profits and taxes.”227 Further, the OECD guidelines for multinational
enterprises incorporate the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and also
include specific guidance on taxation, suggesting that companies should “comply with both the
letter and the spirit” of tax laws and regulations.228
However, despite the clarity of this position and despite the fact that there is a need for
corporations “to realise that it is in their longer-term commercial interest to contribute to
financing the infrastructure, communications, and education levels upon which strong markets
depend,”229 there is a tendency of businesses to omit tax issues from their human rights,
sustainable development, or Corporate Social Responsibility policies,230 and the discourse
around state protection from human rights violations by businesses also has not tended to focus
on this issue.231 This may stem from what De Schutter has identified as the propensity for the
business and human rights discourse to concentrate on what he calls “micro-analysis” – that is,
an examination of the human rights “impact of a particular investment or project.”232
Considering transfer mispricing in the context of business and human rights, conversely, is
consistent with the “macro-analysis” of business and human rights that he recommends, which
225
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looks beyond particular instances of human rights violations by corporations to the structural
effects that business activity can have on the overall realization of rights.233 De Schutter
elaborates: “The legal framework of FDI, in particular, must be critically examined from that
perspective. Otherwise there exists a real risk that, while we devote our energies to scrutinizing
the activities of TNCs in developing states, we forget about the structural dimensions of their
presence in those states, such as the pressure under which developing states are to attract FDI
and the concessions they make to ensure that foreign capital flows in, or the consequences of
FDI on the situation of local producers and investors or on the relative wages.”234 In applying
this analysis specifically to the use of export processing zones to attract FDI, De Schutter
suggests that, “in particular, the absence or quasi-absence of fiscal revenues for the host country
from companies investing in [export processing] zones…seem[s] to be in clear tension with the
right to development of that country.”235 This is equally true for any situation that enables TNCs
to operate in and extract profit within a country without contributing to that country’s fiscal
revenues.236
De Schutter’s macro-analysis represents a vision of the business and human rights framework
that is consistent with the principle of international cooperation and the requirement of an
international social and economic order that provides an enabling environment for the realization
of human rights. If states and businesses are truly committed to the realization of human rights
and to a vision of sustainable development that provides long-term prosperity and improvement
of the human condition, they will have to start giving more attention to structural aspects of the
business and human rights issue, including trade, investment, and international tax policy and the
problem of transfer mispricing.
D. A human rights analytical framework can shift the discourse on transfer
mispricing and increase public awareness.
Ultimately, however, perhaps the greatest contribution that examining transfer mispricing as
a human rights issue can make is as a discursive and analytical tool, bringing a new perspective
to a conversation that is often dominated by technicality and politics and confined to the realms
of economists and diplomats. A human rights perspective has the potential to shift the dominant
tax policy discourse.237 Emphasizing the duty of states to devote maximum available resources to
the realization of human rights moves away from questions of how much revenue is collected
and in what manner. towards questions of allocation and the real uses that revenue can be put
to.238 At the same time, incorporating human rights’ emphasis on equality and nondiscrimination brings in questions of who really benefits from tax policy and revenue allocation,
and recognizing the need for international cooperation in the realization of human rights contests
the dominance of the principle of tax sovereignty.239 “Using the language of rights could thus
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help articulate an approach to tax policy that is more responsive to the problems of global
poverty and economic inequality.”240
A human rights perspective casts the tax policy discourse in terms of duty-bearers and rightsholders, recognizing that, while corporations have an obligation not to engage in transfer
mispricing, ultimate responsibility for ending these practices lies with the state.241 As Kinley
emphasizes, “The significance…of the role of governments in the global economy is not just to
facilitate the conditions for productive, prosperous and prudent commercial enterprise, but also
to ensure that, in the process, they do not renege on their social responsibilities to promote
freedom, equality, order and welfare as represented, in part, by their international human rights
law obligations.”242
Using human rights language puts a human face on debates over tax policy.243 As Robinson
has noted, “Rights lend moral legitimacy and reinforce principles of social justice that already
underpin much development thinking. They help shift the focus of analysis to the most deprived
and excluded, especially to deprivations caused by discrimination.”244 The need for this framing
is evident even within governments. As one tax official interviewed by IBAHRI proposed,
“Legally, it may not make much of a difference to understand tax evasion as a human rights
issue. However the human rights analysis could be very important to help strengthen the tax
system from a tax morale and political perspective.”245
Overall, applying a human rights perspective may seem only relevant to realms of discussion
and debate, but in reality it can have a genuine policy impact. It is important to note that human
rights treaties are binding legal obligations on states, and thus, as the Guidelines on Extreme
Poverty remind us, “States should take into account their international human rights obligations
when designing and implementing all policies, including international trade, taxation, fiscal,
monetary, environmental and investment policies…Before adopting any international agreement,
or implementing any policy measure, States should assess whether it is compatible with their
international human rights obligations.”246 Human rights impact assessments are a policy tool
that can be applied to tax regimes, in order to provide “rigorous, evidence-based scrutiny of the
impacts tax laws, policies and practices have on human rights and equality abroad”247 and at
home.
Further, discussing transfer mispricing as a human rights issue can increase pressure around
these issues from the grassroots, civil society, and the international community.248 “[H]uman
rights can provide a useful frame of reference for greater engagement by citizens in the complex
and technical issues related to tax,”249 and human rights activism is adept at using time-honoured
“naming and shaming” techniques to bring political pressure on states and on private actors.
These techniques have been empirically shown to have an effect in this area, by Dyreng, Hoopes,
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and Wilde, who demonstrate how an ActionAid campaign pressured FTSE 100 companies to
comply with tax disclosure rules.250
Ultimately, the fight to combat transfer mispricing is a long and difficult one, requiring a
struggle against powerful interests, a great deal of technical expertise, and a commitment to
international cooperation. The mechanisms, guidance, and perspective of the international human
rights system do not provide an instant solution to this problem. But they do offer new avenues
for advocacy and a new way of thinking about the issue for those who are committed to solving
it.

IV.

CONCLUSION

It has now been acknowledged that there are a number of systemic causes of detriment to the
enjoyment of human rights that do not fit a traditional understanding of human rights violations
as the specific acts of an individual agent or small group of agents against a particular victim or
group of victims.251 Recognizing that there are more systemic sources of harm, linked to the
operation of social institutions like the global tax regime, some have suggested that a human
rights violation can be said to occur “when there is an avoidable contribution to a negative
human rights impact, and one where those contributing are in a position to know how their
conduct results in a negative impact.”252 Under this definition, engaging in or allowing transfer
mispricing constitutes a human rights violation. The question then is what is to be done about
this violation, what tools are at our disposal for combating it? The good news where transfer
mispricing is concerned is that this is not necessarily an issue where a traditional imbalance of
power will necessarily hamper efforts to address the problem: while developed countries may
have some interest in protecting the profits of the TNCs that call them home, they also have a
significant interest in putting an end to the revenue losses that they themselves experience as a
result of these abusive practices.253 The challenge is bringing these interests in line with those of
developing countries, and most importantly, with those of rights-holding individuals and
communities around the world who bear the true burden of these abuses, and finding a solution
that is just, equitable, and capable of being implemented around the world.
International human rights law provides tools to use in the search for that solution, and an
analytical frame for that search. Most importantly, it provides a legal obligation for states to
solve this problem. As described in Section II above, allowing transfer mispricing violates a
number of human rights treaties and instruments, including the UDHR, the ICESCR, the ICCPR,
the CRC and the DRD. By acting to address transfer mispricing, states will be better able to
comply with their obligations under the ICESCR to take steps towards the progressive realization
of economic, social, and cultural rights. They will help to create stronger societies with greater
incorporation of human rights principles, including equality and non-discrimination and good
governance principles: participation, accountability and transparency. Finally, they will be closer
to fulfilling the promise of the right to development, the promise of a world where international
cooperation can give rise to a new, just international social and economic order where genuinely
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sustainable, human-centered social, economic, cultural and political development can take place
in an enabling environment for all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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